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Josh Chafetz  
Curing Congress’s Ills: Criminal Law as the Wrong 
Paradigm for Congressional Ethics 
Paul M. Thompson’s reply1 to my Comment proposing the creation of 
Congressional Commissioners for Standards2 proceeds in two steps. First, he argues 
that our current system of ethics enforcement, dominated by the ethics committees3 
and the Department of Justice, is working just fine. And second, he argues that the 
establishment of Congressional Commissioners would create, rather than solve, 
problems. Both of these claims suffer from the same basic defect: they assume that 
congressional ethics enforcement should be just like criminal law enforcement. I 
suggest, however, that this assumption is fundamentally misguided. Congressional 
ethics is not simply about punishing rulebreakers; rather, it aims to promote public 
trust in Congress and its members. With this very different goal in mind, it is clear not 
 
1.   Paul M. Thompson, First, Do No Harm: Why a Commissioner for Standards Is Unhealthy for 
the American Body Politic, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 230 (2008), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2008/04/17/thompson.html. 
2.   Josh Chafetz, Comment, Cleaning House: Congressional Commissioners for Standards, 117 YALE 
L.J. 165 (2007).  
3.  It should be noted that our current system—at least in the House of Representatives—is 
about to change to something roughly similar to what was suggested in my Comment. See 
H.R. Res. 895, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007) (enacted pursuant to H.R. Res. 1031, 110th Cong. 
(2008)) (establishing the Office of Congressional Ethics); H.R. Res. 895, 110th Cong. § 4 
(2007) (enacted pursuant to H.R. Res. 1031, 110th Cong. (2008)) (providing that the Office 
of Congressional Ethics shall not undertake any investigations until 120 days after the 
passage of the Resolution). See generally Jonathan Weisman, House Considers New Panel on 
Ethics, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2008, at A3 (describing the new Office and the debates 
surrounding its creation). While the new Office of Congressional Ethics is a welcome start, 
to the extent that it differs in composition from the Congressional Commissioners proposed 
in my Comment, I continue to believe that the institutional design I proposed is preferable. 
A full analysis of the new Office and comparison with my proposal is, however, beyond the 
scope of this piece. 
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only that our current system is in shambles, but also that the creation of Congressional 
Commissioners would be a useful corrective. 
i. the disease 
Thompson begins with a quote from Senator Robert Bennett: “Washington is the 
only place I know where, when people break the law, our reaction is . . . [to] make the 
law tougher.”4 Tangentially, whether or not this is true of “Washington” generally, it 
certainly is not true of congressional ethics specifically, as anyone familiar with the 
collapse of Enron and WorldCom and the subsequent enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley5 
can attest.6 More fundamentally, however, this presupposes that the purpose of 
congressional ethics is limited to the detection and punishment of those who violate a 
list of enumerated rules. Thompson makes this clear when he writes that the current 
system of enforcement by the ethics committees and the Department of Justice is 
“effective at identifying, deterring, and punishing offenders.”7 I would note, first, that 
the data offered by Thompson to support this claim—the number of people censured, 
expelled, and prosecuted under the current system—do not prove his point. After all, to 
show punitive effectiveness, one would need to know not the absolute number of 
people punished but rather the percentage of actual offenders who are punished, as 
well as the fit between the severity of the crime and the seriousness of the punishment. 
And to show that the current system is effective at deterring, one would have to show 
that it actually deters. Thompson has not made any of these showings.8 
More centrally, however, even if Thompson had made all of those showings, he 
would not, I submit, have made a persuasive defense of the current system of 
congressional ethics enforcement. In the criminal law context, one of the goals of the 
system is to prevent people from being punished for behavior that appears to be—but, 
in fact, is not—improper. This explains the requirements of not only proof beyond a 
 
4.  152 CONG. REC. S2450-51 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Bennett). 
5.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
6.   See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (2003) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley toughened 
corporate governance law in the wake of corporate scandals including Enron and 
WorldCom). 
7.  Thompson, supra note 1. 
8.  Indeed, he does not even attempt a response to the criticisms of the ethics committees’ 
inactivity discussed in Chafetz, supra note 2, at 167 (2007). See also Editorial, Partying On, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, at A22 (noting that the House ethics committee “usually sits mute 
as a mesa”). Nor does he discuss my arguments against executive branch enforcement of 
congressional ethics. See JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE 
PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 92-93, 
105-09 (2007); Chafetz, supra note 2, at 165-66. 
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reasonable doubt9 and jury unanimity,10 but also doctrines like the impermissibility of 
ex post facto laws,11 the rule of lenity,12 and the impermissibility of common law 
crimes.13 In other words, the criminal justice system requires a rigorous showing that 
someone violated a rule of which he had clear advance notice. The appearance of 
impropriety will not suffice. 
We have a wholly different standard for those in whom the public trust is reposed. 
They, like Caesar’s wife,14 must be above reproach.15 For example, consider 
impeachment. “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”16 As Charles Black persuasively 
argued, it must be the case that certain offenses are impeachable, although not 
criminally punishable.17 Consider, for example, President Nixon’s infamous “Saturday 
Night Massacre.”18 Although the President undoubtedly has the legal authority to 
demand that his subordinates carry out his orders and to ask for their resignation—or 
even fire them—if they do not,19 it would be odd indeed were Nixon’s firings in an 
 
9.   See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
10.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). 
11.   See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.  
12.    See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 191-93 (2007). 
13.  See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat) 76, 95 (1820). 
14.   See PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 859-61 (John Dryden 
trans., Arthur Hugh Clough ed., Modern Library 1932) (1864) (recounting Caesar’s divorce 
of his third wife, Pompeia, because of the appearance of impropriety created by Clodius’s 
pursuit of her). 
15.   See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1976) (noting Congress’s legitimate interest in 
“safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety” in elections to federal office); Gay v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 974, 977 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the canons of 
judicial conduct are designed to prevent the appearance of impropriety, as well as actual 
impropriety); Reeder v. Kan. City Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 733 F.2d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(“It is proper for a state to insist that the police be, and appear to be, above reproach, like 
Caesar’s wife.”); Jeni L. Lassell, Comment, The Revolving Door: Should Oregon Restrict 
Former Legislators from Becoming Lobbyists?, 82 OR. L. REV. 979, 987 (2003) (noting that a 
federal ban on lobbying by former members of Congress for one year after they leave 
Congress was implemented to prevent the appearance of impropriety); cf. Julia Driver, 
Caesar’s Wife: On the Moral Significance of Appearing Good, 89 J. PHIL. 331 (1992) (arguing 
that we can have a moral duty to avoid actions which appear immoral). See generally 
Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics, Expressive Government, and the 
Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. REV. 653 (2001) (approving the 
appearance of impropriety standard in regulating public life). 
16.   U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  
17.   CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 33-41 (rev. ed. 1998) (1974). 
18.  See Carroll Kilpatrick, President Abolishes Prosecutor’s Office; FBI Seals Records, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 21, 1973, at A1.  
19.  See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).  
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attempt to stymie the Watergate investigation not an impeachable offense.20 Similarly, 
the Constitution allows punishment of a member of Congress for “disorderly 
Behaviour,”21 without specifying that only illegal behavior is disorderly or even that 
punishable behavior must violate a previously promulgated rule of the house.22 
The reason that the ethics regulation of public officials does not include many of 
the protections of criminal law is that in addressing the ethics of public officials we are 
concerned not only with punishing the guilty but also—and, I would suggest, more 
importantly—with both the reality and the public perception of clean government. And 
on this account, the current system clearly fails. As Thompson himself notes, a 
perception of institutional corruption is widespread, and indeed was in large part 
responsible for the Democrats’ takeover of Congress in 2006.23 Thompson remarks that 
the 2006 election results were “more of a blunderbuss than a laser beam, as many of 
the ousted members were not involved in scandals.”24 In other words, Thompson 
assumes that many voters who voted on the corruption issue intended to vote against a 
corrupt member and were simply too ignorant to know that their member was not, in 
fact, corrupt. But this runs counter to the conventional polling wisdom that voters tend 
to think more highly of their own congressman than they do of Congress as a whole.25 I 
suggest, instead, that voters rejected incumbents in unusually large numbers in 2006 
because they considered Congress as an institution to be corrupt—that is, they perceived 
fault not only in the individual members who took bribes or behaved inappropriately 
with House pages, but also in the institution which failed in its constitutional duty to 
 
20.   Indeed, the first article of impeachment against Nixon voted by House Judiciary Committee 
accused him of, inter alia, “interfering or endeavouring to interfere with the conduct of 
investigations by the Department of Justice of the United States, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, and Congressional 
Committees.” Articles of Impeachment, H.R. REP. 1305, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
21.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
22.   See CHAFETZ, supra note 8, at 210 (noting that there are no substantive limitations on 
offenses for which members may be punished by their chamber). 
23.   Thompson, supra note 1. 
24.   Id. 
25.   The classic formulation of this principle is that we “love our congressmen so much more 
than our Congress.” Richard F. Fenno, Jr., If, as Ralph Nader Says, Congress Is “the Broken 
Branch,” How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?, in CONGRESS IN CHANGE: 
EVOLUTION AND REFORM 277, 286 (Norman J. Ornstein ed., 1975); see also Glenn R. Parker 
& Roger H. Davidson, Why Do Americans Love Their Congressmen So Much More Than Their 
Congress?, 4 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 53 (1979). 
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regulate the ethics of its members.26 And in that failure, every member was equally 
culpable.27 
In short, our current ethics system has failed in one of its most fundamental duties: 
it has failed to maintain public trust in Congress. Thompson’s conclusion that the 
current system works just fine completely ignores this function of the system. 
ii. the prescription 
Thompson then goes on to suggest that my proposal for Congressional 
Commissioners for Standards is “worse than the ethics disease itself.”28 Curiously, 
Thompson never notes the success of the British Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Standards, on which my proposal is based—one would think that a well-functioning 
analogue in another country29 would be a compelling consideration when assessing the 
merits in this country. Thompson’s central objection to this proposal is its requirement 
of publicity.30 He argues that a publicity requirement will have two deleterious effects: 
it will eliminate confidentiality,31 and it will make the process “more political.”32 
Thompson argues that confidentiality “encourages candor, protects the rights of 
the accuser and the accused, and allows the committees to use the threat of publicity to 
obtain compliance.”33 The claim that secrecy encourages candor on the part of the 
accused is an odd one. After all, we generally think that a lie told to a great many 
people is more likely to be discovered than a lie told only to a few. And given that lying 
 
26.   See Shaun Bowler & Jeffrey A. Karp, Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Government, 26 POL. 
BEHAV. 271 (2004) (arguing that scandals by individual members of Congress cause a 
decline in the public perception of Congress as an institution). 
27.   See id. at 284 (suggesting that the easiest way to increase public trust in Congress is for 
members of Congress to improve their own collective behavior).  
28.   Thompson, supra note 1. 
29.   See Peter Riddell, The Lords Lag Behind in Keeping Their House in Order, TIMES (London), 
July 17, 2007, at 6 (noting the success of the Parliamentary Commissioner in ethics 
enforcement). 
30.   Thompson also argues that, “[a]t best, the Commissioner will take on a job that is already 
being done by the staff of the ethics committees.” Thompson, supra note 1. But this ignores 
the fact that the ethics committee staff cannot do anything on its own—it simply serves as 
staff to the committee members, who are notoriously reluctant to act. See Chafetz, supra 
note 2, at 167. The Commissioner, on the other hand, would investigate and publicize 
allegations of wrongdoing on her own. Further investigation and punishment would be left 
to the ethics committee, thus preserving the houses’ institutional control, but the 
Commissioner’s report would pressure the committee members to act in ways that will meet 
with public approval. See Chafetz, supra note 2, at 172. 
31.   Thompson, supra note 1. 
32.   Id. 
33.  Id. 
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to the Commissioner would open a Member (or, for that matter, a non-Member) to 
charges of contempt of Congress, it would stand to reason that, the greater the chance 
of a lie being discovered, the less likely the potential liar is to utter it. As far as 
protecting the privacy of the accuser goes, my proposal allows the Commissioner to 
redact portions of her report if they pose a threat to the privacy of third parties.34 But as 
far as protecting the rights of the accused, I would submit that this, again, betrays a 
criminal law mindset where it is not appropriate. Running for office entails accepting 
increased scrutiny of your ethical dealings, and we should demand of our public 
officials a willingness to openly confront allegations against them. 
I note also that my proposal calls for publicizing the Commissioner’s investigations 
after she has completed them;35 thus, a baseless allegation will be released to the public 
along with the Commissioner’s conclusion that it is baseless. This gets to Thompson’s 
second worry—that “those filing complaints may lodge them for purely political 
reasons” and that every complaint will become a campaign ad.36 But given that 
accusations of ethical transgressions will—and should—be campaign issues, anyway, 
isn’t it better to have a regular, transparent process for investigating them? Put 
differently, wouldn’t an innocent Member prefer to have those rumors decisively and 
officially rejected, rather than having them continue to fester without any official 
public repudiation? 
Insofar as Thompson worries that a publicity requirement will deprive the ethics 
committees of the threat of publicity, I confess that I have trouble seeing how this is a 
bad thing. In essence, Thompson is arguing that there is virtue in a system which 
actively promotes the ability of the ethics committees to extort accused Members in 
order to get whatever it is that they—the ethics committee members—want from them. 
There is, of course, no way of ensuring that what the ethics committee members want 
is actually in the public interest, because that would require publicity, which is 
precisely what Thompson seeks to avoid. 
iii. conclusion 
Thompson misses the primary value of publicity for the same reason that he misses 
the extent of the failure of our current ethics enforcement mechanisms. He thinks that 
the purpose of congressional ethics enforcement, like the purpose of criminal law, is to 
punish wrongdoers. But it is not. The purpose of congressional ethics enforcement is 
to promote clean government and public trust in government. An ethics enforcement 
regime that is slow to uncover wrongdoing, even slower to punish it, and conducts its 
business with a presumption of secrecy does not accomplish these goals—and the 
 
34.   Chafetz, supra note 2, at 172 n.41. 
35.  Id. at 172.  
36.  Thompson, supra note 1. 
the yale law journal pocket part 117:238   2008 
244 
 
public has noticed. Seeking to restore confidence in the ethics of public officials is not a 
“futile” “quest for public adulation,”37 as Thompson would have it. It is a fundamental 
condition of democratic governance, and it is one that the creation of Congressional 
Commissioners for Standards would help foster. 
 
Josh Chafetz is a law clerk to the Hon. Guido Calabresi of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Beginning in July, he will be Assistant Professor of Law at 
Cornell Law School. 
 
Preferred Citation: Josh Chafetz, Curing Congress’s Ills: Criminal Law as the Wrong 
Paradigm for Congressional Ethics, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 238 (2008), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2008/04/17/chafetz.html. 
 
37.  Id. 
